Notes Concerning Premise and Presupposition-III


The Columbia Journal of Historiography

Volume One, Fall 2003

An Historian Among the Anthropologists

Matthew A. Cook

Columbia University

"We have to keep a close watch over you historians," a senior anthropologist declared at me during a conference. Despite symbols to the contrary—here, a name tag—anthropologists mistake other anthropologists for historians. In contrast, historians rarely seem to mistake anthropologists for historians. Perhaps historians are more aware that a generation ago the outward difference between the anthropologist and the historian was starkly demarcated. Bernard Cohn, in An Anthropologist Among the Historians, noted the difference in the public eye between "the historian as an ivory-tower dweller and the anthropologist, if they know about him, as some 'odd ball' seeker of the exotic."[1] With wit and humor, Cohn goes on to contrast—among many things—the content of offices (historians have many more books), language (historians carefully, with proper accent, pronounce French, German, or Italian, while anthropologists only occasionally pronounce Arabic, Chinese, or Hindi properly), and even appearance (historians wear dark suits or tweeds while anthropologists remain unstylishly dressed with their hair often uncut and shoes unshined).[2] But today one is just as likely to hear anthropologists as historians carefully pronouncing "foreign words" with the proper accent (particularly if it's French literary theory!). And a friend from outside the discipline remarked to me that "you can always tell anthropologists by how stylish they are—often all decked out in black."

Anthropology and anthropologists have taken a turn toward history. Anthropology and history mutually influenced each other in a variety of ways. Both fields have a common concern with text and context, both entail acts of translation, and both—rather than trying to construct social laws and prediction—aim to understand and explicate the meaning of people's actions in time and place. Nevertheless, history and anthropology parody their interdisciplinary task when each borrows concepts from the other out of context. History cannot be made more historical by blindly appropriating anthropology; anthropology cannot be made more anthropological by embezzling history.

This paper argues that anthropology and history—to paraphrase Bernard Cohn—must be cautious when borrowing each other's "used" concepts. Through the lens of anthropology's history, I seek to better understand one such noteworthy case: Burton Stein's Peasant State and Society in Medieval South India. I critically examine the historical relationship between this work and the age of structural-functionalism in anthropology. I argue that the "segmentary" state model in Stein's text bares strong traces of ideas advocated by structural-functionalism's patriarch: A.R. Radcliffe-Brown. In conclusion, I use my comparison of Stein and Radcliffe-Brown to highlight particular strategies for contextualizing when borrowing concepts across disciplinary boundaries.

In the Shadow of Radcliffe-Brown: Stein and the Segmentary State

Burton Stein's Peasant State and Society in Medieval South India is a seminal work in South Indian scholarship. Its status is reflected in the deferential posture adopted toward it by those generating scholarship on South India.[3] Stein himself considers his work "somewhat perverse in theoretical and historiographical senses."[4] He bases this self-evaluation on the fact that he considers his book a "radical reworking," which borders on "iconoclastism," characterized by a "disrespect, even arrogance, about what previous scholars in this field have accomplished."[5] From the perspective of postmodern paradigm shifts since the 1980s, Stein's ideas remain less radical than his comments indicate.[6]

Although not as radical as he maintains, Stein did have a change of paradigm in mind when writing Peasant State and Society in Medieval South India. Stein proposes a comparative approach to studying South India which he juxtaposes to preexisting "conjectural" models.[7] But Stein's juxtaposition of the comparative approach to those based on conjecture makes Peasant State and Society in Medieval South India appear less than revolutionary: a similar debate raged during the 20th century in anthropology between structural-functionalist theorists—led by Radcliffe-Brown—and those advocating "pseudo-historical" models based on the "conjecture" of cultural evolution and diffusion.[8]

Radcliffe-Brown led the structural-functionalist paradigm shift in anthropology beginning in the 1920s. Structural-functionalism reached its apex in the 1940s and 1950s, and was "slain" in the 1960s.[9] While there were differences between structural-functionalist theorists, they were all unified against what they termed "pseudo-history."[10] There is no mistaking who was being referred to with this label: evolutionists.[11] Structural-functionalists objected to evolutionary methods, not because they were diachronic, but rather because they created "pseudo-causal" explanations.[12] Radcliffe-Brown elaborates:

The literature dealing with kinship is loaded with theories that can only be described as pseudo-historical. There are many variety of such theories, but they all have one thing in common. Starting from some known condition in the present or in the historically recorded past, an "explanation" of it is invented by imagining some condition or event in the unrecorded past and arguing on a priori grounds that the known condition might or must have had its origin in this way.[13]

Radcliffe-Brown also criticizes the "pseudo-historical" on the grounds that its theories build on conjecture and imagination, rather than first-hand experience through fieldwork.[14]

Radcliffe-Brown felt strongly that if one is to develop a comprehensive methodological critique, one must be prepared to offer alternatives.[15] He advocated replacing "pseudo-history" methodologies with a comparative approach.[16] This comparative methodology has three broadly defining emphases: (1) structure, (2) holism, and (3) synchrony.

The Axioms of Radcliffe-Brown's Comparative Approach

For Radcliffe-Brown, the goal of the comparative approach was to develop a "natural system," characterized—like the geometry of Euclid—by a set of logical relations. The concept of "structure" formed the basis of this logical system:

When we use the term structure we are referring to some sort of ordered arrangement of parts or components. A musical composition has a structure, and so does a sentence. A building has a structure, so does a molecule or an animal. The components or units of social structures are persons, and a person is a human being considered not as an organism but as occupying positions in a social structure.[17]

The comparative emphasizes the relationships between social positions within a larger (socio-structural) context. Radcliffe-Brown specifically discusses this methodology in relationship to understanding the state by drawing parallels between society and polity:

The social structure of any society includes differentiation of social roles between persons and between classes of persons. The role of an individual is the part he plays in the total social life—economic, political, religious, etc. . . . . As we pass from the simpler to the more complex societies we find increasing differentiation of individual from individual and usually some more or less definite division of the community into classes. As political organization develops there is an increasing differentiation whereby certain persons—chiefs, kings, judges, military commanders, etc.—have special roles in social life. Each such person may be said to hold or fill an office—administrative, judicial, legislative, military, or other. The holder of an office in this sense is endowed with authority, and to the office there attach certain duties and also certain rights and privileges.[18]

The comparative method, through the differentiation of roles, develops broad typologies.[19] These typologies are best thought of as taxonomies: subjects divided into classes that are both distinct and ordered.[20] By emphasizing the development of ordered and distinct subjects, the concept of typology leads to the second defining feature of the comparative method: holism.

Radcliffe-Brown views the comparative method's development of typologies as a holistic endeavor:

[comparative] analysis, as the term is here being used, is a procedure that can only be applied to something that is in itself a whole or synthesis. By it we separate out, in reality or in thought, the components of a complex whole and there discover the relation of these components to one another within the whole.[21]

This holistic approach and an emphasis on the concept of structure, combine to give the third defining feature of the comparative method: synchrony.

In developing the comparative method, Radcliffe-Brown attempted to avoid the a priori that characterized the conjectural approaches of "pseudo-history." In doing so, he drew a strong distinction between a diachronic approach, which he saw at the core of "pseudo-history," and the comparative method's synchronic approach. Radcliffe-Brown explained the differences between the two approaches:

In a synchronic description we give an account of a form of social life as it exists at a certain time, abstracting as far as possible from changes that may be taking place in its features. A diachronic account on the other hand is an account of such changes over a period.[22]

The strong distinction drawn by the comparative method between synchrony and diachrony has resulted in charges of ahistoricism against Radcliffe-Brown. While the historicity of comparative analysis can be debated, the method has produced statements overtly hostile to historical approaches.[23] For example, Radcliffe-Brown states:

In statics we attempt to discover and define conditions of existence or of coexistence; in dynamics we try to discover conditions of change. The conditions of existence of molecules or of organisms are matters of statics, and similarly the conditions of existence of societies, social systems, or forms of social life are matter for social statics. Whereas the problems of social dynamics deal with the conditions of change of forms of social life. The basis of science is system classification. It is the first task of social statics to make some attempt to compare forms of social life in order to arrive at classifications. But forms of social life cannot be classified into species and genera in the way we classify forms of organic life; the classification has to be not specific but typological . . . .[24]

Therefore, the comparative analyst is primarily concerned with the theme of "continuity."[25] This emphasis, in conjunction with a strong tendency to eschew diachrony, characterizes the ahistorical nature of the comparative method.

Stein's Segmentary Model

Radcliffe-Brown's comparative approach tends to portray social phenomena writ large, labeling and describing large domains of shared belief and understanding. In contrast, historians—often more concerned with class, race and gender differences—recognize skeptically that experiences within singular social domains vary. It's not surprising, therefore, that historians only reluctantly engage totalizing "structural" perspectives like those of Radcliffe-Brown. While most historians agree history is about change and not structure,[26] such agreement does not impede Stein from taking a turn toward perspectives popularized in anthropology by Radcliffe-Brown.

Stein, like Radcliffe-Brown, expresses concern with the state of his field. Stein states that "the preconceptions of the historian have been permitted to intrude upon the basic evidence."[27] This apparent concern with a priori reasoning is found in Stein's criticism of historians who do not allow their "fieldwork" to guide their representations.[28] According to Stein, this leads to a priori approaches, which allow "pseudo-historical" statements. In particular, Stein focuses his criticism on Nilakanta Shastri who purports similarities between South Indian settlements and the Roman cities of Gaul.[29] In reaction to such "pseudo-historical" propositions, Stein proposes an alternative approach which sets aside a priori reasoning in favor of comparison. Stein calls this approach "segmentary," and applies it to the medieval South Indian state.

The South Indian "segmentary" state is characterized by a set of relations that form a logical system. Stein describes the nature of this logical system:

Segmentation refers to persistent combinatorial patterns among social elements which are distinct and often opposed. Such distinct elements are regarded analytically as social segments. These elements are parts of a social whole, which ultimately extended to the peoples of the sub-continent, to which the term Indic may be applied; they are also parts of the many culture regions into which medieval India was partitioned.[30]

In the above passage, Stein proposes an approach that emphasizes relationships between social positions within a larger context or structure. The nature of this structure is both distinct and ordered:

This is the pyramidally segmented type of state, so-called because the smallest unit of political organization—for example, a section of a peasant village—was linked to ever more comprehensive units of political organization of an ascending order (e.g., village, locality, supralocality, and kingdom) for various purposes, but that each unit stood in opposition to other, similar units (e.g., one section of a village as against another) . . . .[31]

These structures, consisting of distinct and ordered classes, can then be used to develop typologies with which to "partition" medieval India's "many culture regions."[32] The invocation of cultural regions characterized by distinct typologies clearly suggests a holistic approach similar to that found in Radcliffe-Brown's writings.

Stein, throughout Peasant State and Society in Medieval South India, repeatedly makes holistic statements. These statements, when in reference to the state, are concerned with a "single cogent model."[33] For example, Stein states:

The conception outlined above [the segmentary state] pertains to the ways in which relatively self-sufficient, enduring, and often quite ancient localized societies can be linked together to form a state. Such a state is not an amalgamation or absorption of localized unit into an organic greater unit such as is implicit in the unitary state, but is an arrangement in which local units—segments—retain their essential being as segmental parts of a whole.[34]

Does this obviously holist approach, in conjunction with Stein's emphasis on the concept of "segmentary" structure, result in the same synchrony as Radcliffe-Brown's comparative method? Is Stein an ahistorical historian?

Radcliffe-Brown, by strongly distinguishing synchrony from diachrony, clearly believed that comparative anthropologists need not be historical.[35] Are historians who adopt such a comparative approach able to circumvent this method's aversion to diachrony? It is clear from Stein's work that the answer is no. Stein throughout Peasant State and Society in Medieval South India, makes statements which are hostile to the concept of change. Many of these statements refer to the defining feature of South India: the micro-regions called the nadus.[36] However, the theme of continuity is also raised in relationship to the state. For example, Stein states that the medieval South Indian Chola state was:

Among the greatest states in medieval India in its durability [emphasis mine] and scope of its authority . . . .[37]

Stein also argues that the older families who dominated the nadus, thereby constituting the backbone of the Chola empire, "continued to hold sway, preserving their ancient family identities even as they assumed additional titles linking them to the Cholas."[38] Clearly then, in the work of Stein, the comparative approach's emphasis on structure and holism do point toward a synchrony characterized by ahistoricism.

Toward Contextualizing Stein's Segmentary State

At first, I found the methodological parallels between Burton Stein and Radcliffe-Brown baffling. How could there be such a connection between an anthropologist and a historian working in disparate fields, areas, and times?[39] A better understanding of the idea of "context" and the influence of anthropologist Aidan Southall on Stein are key to exploring this question.

Texts, or any social production for that matter, are not neatly bounded objects. Rather, they are parts of broader social frameworks of ideas that are interactive. Texts are objects whose potential meaning "in context" is realized in relation to other texts. A consequence of such "intertextuality" is that interpretation must be situated not in isolation but within larger networks. Such an approach to understanding context breaks down the boundary between a text's internal and external planes and gives the appearance of a "mosaic of parts derived from elsewhere." [40]

The relationship between this mosaic of parts and a text is highly indexical in the sense that the latter is produced both under and within horizons of perspectives.[41] Because texts contain indexical components, they are incomplete when viewed apart from the broader environment to which they respond. Like linguistic signs—which lose meaning when shorn of their references—interpretation must take texts' indexical ground into account. By foregrounding indexical elements which appear "hidden" at times as background, it is possible to examine logically distinct but experientially overlapping horizons of social knowledge within texts. This process of "contextualization" maps out authors and ideas in relationship to social matrices of knowledge that contain co-participants who are not necessarily co-present. Radcliffe-Brown, while not co-present in Stein's text, is nonetheless a co-participant in its production. By highlighting the influence of Aidan Southall on Stein, I foreground indexical elements of Peasant State and Society in Medieval South India to illustrate how Radcliffe-Brown is a co-participant who is not textually co-present. In light of this argument, I evaluate the continued historiographic importance of Stein's text for the study of South India.

Stein credits Southall, an anthropologist, as the influence that encouraged him to adopt a "segmentary" model.[42] Stein, however, does not inform his readers (or does not know) that Southall's model was designed to fit, "into the theory of political anthropology of the 1940s."[43] Political anthropology in the 1940s was dominated by thought and practice associated with Radcliffe-Brown's comparative methodology. If one examines Southall's work, a web of influences that bear the fingerprints of Radcliffe-Brown becomes evident. For example, Daryll Forde wrote the preface to Southall's second book Social Change in Modern Africa.[44] Forde co-edited the seminal structural-functional work African Kinship Systems with Radcliffe-Brown. Also, Southall credits E.E. Evans-Pritchard's African Political Systems with inspiring his own work on the segmentary model.[45] While a student of Bronislav Malinowski, Evans-Pritchard makes "no bones" about the fact he considered himself a follower of Radcliffe-Brown.[46] In fact, Radcliffe-Brown and not Malinowski wrote the preface to Evans-Pritchard's African Political Systems. Finally, the rest of Southall's intellectual credits reads like a who's who of structural-functionalism, a theoretical field in anthropology in which Radcliffe-Brown is the undisputed patriarch.[47]

How are we to evaluate Burton Stein's impact on the field of South Indian studies in light of his connection to structural-functionalism? Such connections to a specific era and type of anthropology do not undermine his importance. His work remains seminal. Stein brought about a fundamental shift in the manner in which his discipline treats its subject: His work represents a shift from idiographic to nomenthetic inquiry. Radcliffe-Brown makes the following distinction between these two:

In idiographic inquiry the purpose is to establish as acceptable certain particular or factual propositions or statements. A nomenthetic inquiry, on the contrary, has for its purpose to arrive at acceptable general propositions.[48]

A simple comparison of Stein's theories of segmentary institutions with Nilakanta Shastri's prosaic prose makes clear the extent of the fundamental shift of perspective that Peasant State and Society in Medieval South India represents.


Stein's work underlines the value of using an interdisciplinary approach in anthropology and history. While Stein may represent an important historiographic change in South Indian studies, his writing does not represent a particularly radical shift of thought from an anthropological perspective. His work builds on methodologies first developed thirty to fifty years previously by Radcliffe-Brown. He remains less radical than Radcliffe-Brown who declares to his readers that "observation and the selection of what to record need to be guided by theory."[49] Further, by not giving the reader the full historical background to the theoretical models he proposes, Stein is either not completely straightforward, or not sensitive enough to the processes involved in borrowing another discipline's concepts.

It is easy to agree that anthropology and history benefit from borrowing insights and analytical perspectives (i.e., "used" concepts). Yet, in practice, such cross-disciplinary conjunctions often result in one field subordinating the other.[50] Such subordination is achieved, in part, by failing—as Stein does—to recognize sufficiently the discursive histories that texts carry. When transporting texts across disciplinary boundaries, one must remember that they emerge from particular historical contexts. Close historical attention is important during texts' cross-discipline translation because in this process context is ever more open to "false objectivity." False objectivity emerges from the positivistic character which defines many understandings of context; it construes "the idea" as a set of conditions outside the text.[51]

Rather than reify context in this way, it is necessary to retain and illuminate the historical discourses that texts carry. This shift in perspective looks to move context away from being a reified product and toward being a process (i.e., contextualization). As an active process that traces relations between texts and other texts, contextualization indexically examines how discourses emerge and are embedded in writing. In contrast to the idea of texts-in-context (implying two externally related terms), contextualization reserves a "constitutive function to context within text itself."[52] In other words, texts are not bounded linguistic artifacts but configurations of signs with locutionary effects that are embedded in coherent and interactive communities of users. These communities of users both produce the discourses that inform texts, and are the locations from which users understand discourses in texts.[53]

Stein in Peasant State and Society in Medieval South India fails to acknowledge (and therefore fails to capitalize on) the discourses that describe and inform Aidan Southhall's text and its community of users (i.e., structural-functionalism and its advocates). Unlike an historian who painstakingly traces the trails of texts in archives, Stein does not sufficiently track the texts of anthropology that inform his methodology. By ignoring such broader horizons, Stein opens blank spots of "indeterminacy" which fail to acknowledge contexts' role in the making and reading of texts.[54] The presence of such blank spots in a work which translates a discipline's "used" concepts draws attention—particularly for an historically-oriented anthropologist—to how interdisciplinary research is not a simple dialogue or co-engagement between two fields of study. Rather, it points toward the complexities of cross-disciplinary research by bringing critical reflection upon the conjunction of perspectives from "regulated" fields such as anthropology and history.

1. Bernard Cohn, The Anthropologist Among the Historians and Other Essays (Delhi, 1987), 15.

2. Ibid., 4-5

3. Nicholas Dirks, "Political Authority and Structural Change in Early South Indian History," The Indian Association of Economic and Social History Reader 13.2 (1976): 125-157; Arjun Appadurai and Carol Breckenridge "The South Indian Temple: Authority, Honour, and Redistribution," Contributions to Indian Sociology 10.2 (1976): 187-211.

4. Burton Stein, Peasant State and Society in Medieval South India (Delhi, 1994[1980]), v.

5. Ibid.

6. I entered the discipline of anthropology at the University of California, Santa Cruz (U.C.S.C.) in the late 1980s. It was a time and place at the center of paradigm shift within anthropology: Writing Culture: The Politics and Poetic of Ethnography was published in 1986. Edited by George Marcus from Rice University, and James Clifford from U.C.S.C. this book rocked the foundations of anthropological authority and changed the discipline's standards by successfully advocating the adoption of critical theory. It was this sort of book that I expected after completing the preface of Peasant State and Society in Medieval South India. Stein, however, did not have my expectations in mind when he wrote his book.

7. Stein, 264.

8. A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society (Glencoe, Ill., 1952), 3.

9. Eric Wolf, "Facing Power—Old Insights, New Questions," American Anthropologist 92.3 (Sept. 1990): 586.

10. For an example of vicissitudes among structural-functionalists, compare Evans-Pritchard's statement that anthropology is "one of the humanities" (E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Social Anthropology and Other Essays [New York, 1962], 7) and Radcliffe-Brown's contention that it is a science (A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, A Natural Science of Society [Glencoe, Ill., 1948,] 63).

11. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function, 15

12. Matthew A. Cook, "Rethinking Rex: Radcliffe-Brown, Evolution, and the History of Anthropology," Eastern Anthropologist 50.3-4 (1997): 193-205.

13. A.R. Radcliffe-Brown and Daryll Forde, eds. African Systems of Kinship and Marriage (London, 1950): 1.

14. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function, 3.

15. Ibid., 15.

16. Ibid., 1; Radcliffe-Brown, African Systems, 2.

17. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function, 9-10.

18. A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, "Preface," African Political Systems, eds. Myer Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard (London, 1940), xxi.

19. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function, 7.

20. Robert Hardgrave, Jr. and James Bill, Comparative Politics: The Quest for Theory (Lanham, Md., 1981), 24.

21. Radcliffe-Brown, African Systems of Kinship, 2.

22. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function, 4.

23. According to Evans-Pritchard the distinction between history and anthropology is spurious (Evans-Pritchard, Social Anthropology, 180), while even Radcliffe-Brown states that historical approaches which are non-teleological are worth pursuing (Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function, 8).

24. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function, 7.

25. Ibid., 10.

26. Nicholas Dirks, "Is Vice Versa? Historical Anthropologists and Anthropological Histories," in The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences, ed., Terence J. MacDonald (Ann Arbor, 1996), 31.

27. Stein, 255.

28. Stein, 264. The use of the label "conjectural" by Stein (264) to describe the work of pre-existing scholars of medieval South Indian politics should not be viewed as capricious. Rather the term's use is an excellent example of how both Stein and the structural-functionalists shared common concerns. "Conjectural" is, according to Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard, the defining feature of the "pseudo-history" they were so critical of (Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function, 3; and Evans-Pritchard, Social Anthropology, 25).

29. Stein, 256. Stein's criticisms of predecessors' work is deeply ironic as he himself is a "synthesizer" of data, and is well known for looking down on those working with original sources. As such, Stein reflects the contentious divide among comparativists who either "leap over conceptual and theoretical terrain," or make "unyielding commitments . . . to particular intellectual frameworks, classificatory schemes, and research techniques as positive truth" (Hardgrave and Bill, 231).

30. Stein, 22.

31. Ibid., 264.

32. Ibid., 22.

33. Ibid., 281.

34. Ibid., 275.

35. Evans-Pritchard, Social Anthropology, 172.

36. Stein, 90.

37. Ibid., 254.

38. Ibid., 117.

39. For a more general discussion of the relationship between the anthropology of Africa and the history of India see Bernard Cohn, The Anthropologist Among the Historians and Other Essays (Delhi, 1987), 200-223.

40. William Hanks, Intertexts: Writings on Language, Utterance and Context (Lanham, Md., 2000), 127.

41. William Hanks, in Intertexts, insightfully discusses indexicality in the following manner: ". . . referential function is joined to an indexical ground, in a way that the deictic denotes an object relative to the context of its utterance. So a term like 'this' might encode 'the one (referent) proximal to (relational predicate) us right now (indexical ground).' Or concretely, I denote the book near me as 'this,' and the one across the way as 'that.' Notice that if you take away the indexical ground, there is no way of identifying the referent, and there is no denotation. All you have left is 'the one proximal to ____.' Taken in isolation from a speech context, there is no way to associate the term 'this' with an object, because there is no property of 'thisness' that is shared by all those things it may properly refer to in speech. The property 'proximal' is a likely candidate, but it is a pure relation—proximal to what? The minimal structure has three parts—the referent pole, the indexical pole, and the relation that binds them. Moreover, in this relation, the indexical element is backgrounded, whereas the referent is foregrounded. To interpret my utterance of 'this' or 'that' as denoting the Book, you must relate it to context, but it is the book, not the context, which is the focal object. Hence, we say that context serves as the indexical ground of the reference." (6)

42. Stein, 264.

43. Aidan Southall, "The Segmentary State in Africa and Asia," Comparative Studies in Society and History 30.1 (1988): 52.

44. Aidan Southall, Social Change in Modern Africa (London, 1961), v-vii.

45. Southall, Segmentary State in Africa, 52.

46. For a more in-depth perspective on Evans-Pritchard's intellectual allegiances see his contrast between Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski in Social Anthropology and Other Essays (54 and 74) and Mary Douglas' comments on Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski's relationship (Mary Douglas, Edward Evans-Pritchard [New York, 1980], 36-7).

47. Southall cites A.I. Richards, and Raymond Firth, both students of Malinowski (Firth went on to occupy Malinowski's chair at the University of London, while Richards eventually secured a position in Radcliffe-Brown's department of anthropology at Cambridge).

48. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function, 1.

49. Radcliffe-Brown, Preface, xiii.

50. Dirks, "Vice Versa," 35.

51. Richard Bauman and Charles Briggs, "Poetics and Performance as Critical Perspectives on Language and Social Life," Annual Review of Anthropology 19 (1990): 68.

52. William Hanks, "Text and Textuality," Annual Review of Anthropology 18 (1989): 106.

53. Ibid., 96.

54. Roman Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art: An Investigation on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic and Theory of Literature (Evanston, 1973).




Web-Stat hit counters

Words! Mere Words! Was there anything so real as words? - Dorian Gray